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The COVID-19 crisis has reignited 
questions about the centrality of law 
in stemming the spread of infectious 
diseases. There are questions about 
whether new laws can enable greater 
international collaboration, collective 
action and shared responsibility and 
accountability for new global health 
threats. In addressing these global 
health threats, it will be necessary to 
look to global health law, refl ecting 
“the study and practice of interna-
tional law that shapes norms and pro-
cesses and institutions to create the 
conditions for people throughout the 
world to attain the highest possible 
level of physical and mental health.”1
These sources of global health law 
have been categorized under inter-
national law into hard law (e.g., trea-
ties that bind states) and soft law 
(e.g., codes of practice negotiated by 
states).2
This column examines the central 
importance of soft law in develop-
ing and implementing global health 
law. Beginning by situating the role of 
hard and soft law in the frameworks 
of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), this column illustrates the 
centrality of soft law in global health 
law governance. The column then 
looks to the potential application 
of soft law in resolving some of the 
wider questions of infectious disease 
control in the wake of the COVID-
19 crisis, concluding that soft law is 
complementary to the hard law, as it 
off ers a fl exible way to mobilize the 
consent and commitment of states 
in a rapidly changing global health 
environment. 
Hard Law and Soft Law in Global 
Health 
Although hard law is binding and soft 
law is not, the distinction is actually 
more nuanced. Legal norms are not 
binary, but are based on graduated 
normativity, from binding to non-
binding.3 Global health law ranges 
from binding treaties and norms (e.g., 
those encompassed in the right to 
health and other human rights norms 
codifi ed under international law) to 
authoritative yet non-binding norma-
tive instruments, such as resolutions, 
declarations, guidelines, protocols, 
and recommendations. The imple-
mentation of both hard and soft law 
may rely on policy recommendations 
which need not have any normative 
content at all.
The Constitution of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) grants 
the World Health Assembly consider-
able powers to develop global health 
law.4 Yet, in its history, the WHO 
has developed only two treaties: the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) and the International 
Health Regulations (IHR), and many 
scholars believe that the WHO should 
have used its lawmaking authority to 
agree to more binding law to address 
global health problems.5 The WHO 
has struggled to fulfi ll its mandate to 
develop global health law for three 
main reasons. Firstly, many global 
health issues are highly complex and 
highly interdependent with other 
international law regimes, such as 
trade and the environment, which 
makes it diffi  cult for the WHO to gain 
international agreement in the World 
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Health Assembly. Secondly, global 
health outcomes are increasingly 
determined by non-state actors, such 
as corporations, which are outside of 
the direct scope of WHO governance. 
Thirdly, as seen in the two treaties 
that the WHO has developed, it is not 
always easy for the WHO to catalyze 
state implementation. 
The FCTC entered into force in 
2005, creating legally binding norms 
to reduce the demand for and supply 
of tobacco, with information shar-
ing to achieve tobacco control glob-
ally. The FCTC is often viewed as a 
momentous achievement; however, 
the treaty took over a decade to nego-
tiate, with a politically contentious 
process in which states struggled 
to rein in the power of Big Tobacco, 
which lobbied state representatives 
in an effort to prevent FCTC adop-
tion. Despite its success, the treaty 
has two major weaknesses: First, it 
contains ambiguous language, which 
allows countries broad discretion in 
interpreting treaty provisions, lead-
ing to inconsistent implementation. 
Second, it does not provide resources 
to low- and middle-income countries 
to support implementation of the 
FCTC. Big Tobacco has continued to 
fight back against the FCTC, bringing 
cases under multiple international 
law regimes, such as the World Trade 
Organization and investment trea-
ties, to prevent states from adopting 
tobacco-control legislation.6 
Likewise, the IHR, which aims 
to prevent, protect, and control the 
spread of infectious diseases, took ten 
years to negotiate and has been cri-
tiqued for its ambiguity with regards 
to the notification system, lack of 
certainty about the circumstances 
under which diseases are declared a 
Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern, and above all for its 
lack of accountability for violations. 
For instance, countries have often 
failed to inform the WHO when fac-
ing a disease outbreak, have remained 
unprepared to respond to public 
health emergencies in line with their 
IHR obligations, and have rejected 
specific WHO advice in the emer-
gency response, instituting additional 
measures such as border closures in 
violation of their human rights obliga-
tions.7 Without accountability under 
global health law, states have not 
complied with key provisions that are 
set out by the IHR, thereby leading to 
the spread of infectious diseases.8
The Benefits of Soft Law 
Looking beyond these treaties, the 
WHO has been very successful at 
using soft law for global health gov-
ernance: to regulate issues such as 
unhealthy food and diets, give nor-
mative clarification to treaties, set 
standards, ensure monitoring and 
accountability, and serve as precur-
sor to hard law, especially when the 
science is still uncertain or there is a 
lack of political consensus. 
Soft laws have grown within the 
WHO framework because they are 
easy and quick for states to adopt. 
Their non-binding nature can help 
achieve consensus in difficult areas 
where different countries have dif-
ferent interests but also where the 
commercial interests of private 
actors are involved. For instance, in 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, soft 
law was used to clarify which norms 
trumped others when there was a 
clash between the competing regimes 
of international trade law and global 
health law.9 This soft law agreement 
allowed countries to prioritize access 
to medicines as part of the right to 
health over the rights of intellectual 
property, thereby ensuring access to 
generic medicines. 
Additionally, soft law can also 
form a basis for hard law, especially 
in highly technical areas, or where 
states need political space for consen-
sus building. The FCTC was agreed in 
2003 after a series of 17 non-binding 
resolutions on tobacco control were 
passed between 1970 and 1988 by the 
World Health Assembly, and built 
upon the 1998 establishment of the 
WHO Tobacco Free Initiative. 
Nevertheless, soft law does have 
limitations. If not backed by an 
authoritative body, soft law may lack 
the binding obligations necessary to 
motivate states to act. For example, 
the WHO’s Global Code of Practice 
on the International Recruitment of 
Health Personnel has had little effect 
on domestic policies and practices 
because it has ambiguous provi-
sions without binding obligations to 
prevent the recruitment of essential 
health personnel across countries.10 
Another disadvantage of soft law is 
that organizations that rely on it may 
be perceived as weak. For example, 
if the WHO acts principally through 
non-binding agreements, while other 
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sectors develop hard law, this may 
prevent the WHO from being seen as 
an authoritative international actor,11 
which could cause states to skew their 
regulatory preferences toward areas 
in which they may face accountability 
for non-compliance, causing a regu-
latory chill in public health regula-
tion.12 However, there is evidence that 
states are agreeing to fewer hard law 
treaties over time, which means that, 
for the moment, soft law remains the 
most plausible way to frame global 
governance.13
In strengthening soft law, indica-
tors provide a path to evaluate prog-
ress and promote accountability. 
For instance, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has 
developed human rights indicators 
to monitor human rights structures, 
processes and outcomes as a way of 
evaluating human rights implemen-
tation across countries.14 Similarly, 
UNAIDS uses a series of indicators 
that arise out of the UN Political Dec-
larations on AIDS in order to measure 
how countries are responding to the 
AIDS pandemic.15 Soft law thus bro-
kers compliance through monitoring 
and review to facilitate accountabil-
ity for compliance with international 
agreements. 
Reimagining Soft Law in the 
Wake of the COVID-19 Crisis 
The current COVID-19 pandemic has 
shown that global health law is criti-
cal in responding to infectious dis-
eases, with four specific possibilities 
for soft law to address the pandemic: 
1. Clarification of State Obligations  
The WHO could use soft law to 
clarify and reinforce technical 
guidance in areas such as contact 
tracing, testing, treatment, and 
public health responses. While 
much of this guidance has been 
technical, there is scope for this 
guidance to become normative if 
it reinforces existing legal norms, 
facilitating state compliance with 
the law. 
2. Soft Law Amendments to the IHR  
Although the WHO has played a 
critical role in global health gover-
nance, there is uncertainty about 
its role in a post-pandemic world. 
Scholars have identified a number 
of weaknesses in the IHR.16 There 
have been calls to give the IHR 
wider-ranging enforcement pow-
ers, involve more private sector 
actors, and expand its core man-
date.17 However, current geopolit-
ical tensions also make it difficult 
to revise the IHR. Soft law might 
provide a way forward.18
3. Normative Guidance  
The WHO could use soft law to 
further normative guidance in 
areas such as the relationship 
between the IHR and human 
rights. Human rights have a 
strong textual foundation in the 
revised IHR (2005), both as a 
protection against measures 
that unnecessarily interfere with 
individual liberties and for inter-
preting and implementing every 
aspect of the IHR, notably the 
right to health.19 The COVID-19 
crisis has highlighted the need for 
more normative guidance within 
the context of human rights: for 
instance, large-scale quarantines, 
discrimination against vulnerable 
groups, increased digital surveil-
lance, and access to vaccines. 
For instance, the existence of the 
COVAX facility to finance vac-
cines for people in the developing 
world could be strengthened if 
the WHO gave some normative 
guidance on international obliga-
tions of “solidarity” as part of the 
essential fulfillment of the right to 
health. 
4. Better Enforcement Mechanisms  
Previously, the WHO used soft 
law to enable accountability. For 
instance, when Indonesia refused 
to share its samples of the avian 
flu virus, because it feared that it 
would not get a fair share of the 
resulting scientific discoveries, the 
WHO PIP Framework (a soft law 
instrument developed under the 
WHO) was created to incorpo-
rate benefit sharing for countries, 
including both monetary and in-
kind benefits.20 There have been 
several suggestions about how 
the WHO could use soft law to 
improve enforcement, including 
by creating a forum that would try 
to ease political tensions through 
sharing and discussing national 
risk assessments, mediating 
informally between states, and 
enabling greater coordination in 
the response to infectious dis-
eases.21 The WHO Director Gen-
eral has also proposed a system 
of universal periodic review, in 
which countries agree to a regular 
and transparent review of each 
nation’s preparedness.22 
Conclusion
Global health law is largely consti-
tuted through soft law, and soft law 
needs to be viewed as complementary 
to hard law. An understanding of soft 
law renews our optimism about what 
is possible in global health law, as 
using soft law offers a quick and flex-
ible way to mobilize the consent and 
commitment of states in a rapidly 
changing environment with multi-
stakeholder involvement. 
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